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I. INTRODUCTION 
At a faculty lunch a couple of years ago, one of us, a teacher of Property and a 
student of metaphor and the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, heard the other, a scholar 
specializing in intellectual property, describe a paper about “things.”1  Conversations 
ensued, drafts were exchanged, comments were discussed, and a productive dialogue 
emerged.  That dialogue has matured into this Comment.  It seems altogether fitting 
that our discussion is honed and framed by the work of Margaret Jane Radin, whose 
signal work on commodification and objectification in law has proved so thought-
provoking. 
We begin in considerable sympathy with Radin’s relational approach to property.  
In somewhat differing ways, we each relate this relational approach to its beginnings 
in metaphor and the central organizing value that metaphor has in producing 
knowledge.  We take our cue from Radin’s work, but like others, we intend to take 
the commodification/objectification inquiry in some new directions, exploring both 
the ongoing potential of metaphor to illuminate both questions of theory and 
doctrine, and how various ways of thinking about commodification and 
objectification can—in the words of Radin’s contribution to this Symposium—help 
us to situate the “neighborhood” of property law in a city of diverse and 
interdependent communities.2
As its two main Parts will evidence, this Comment remains the product of two 
distinct if overlapping voices.  Part II returns to the conceptual origins of Radin’s 
theory in her general critique of objectification and commodification.  It asks 
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1Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Madison, Law as Design]. 
2Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and its Legal Milieu, 54 
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whether a more positive concept of objectification can be recovered that is 
distinguishable from reification, the latter seeming to be the more appropriate locus 
of Radin’s criticism.  Part III’s response to Radin is similar, but it tries to exemplify 
both our appreciation of and our differences from her work through more detailed 
analysis of intellectual property law and theory. 
II.  OBJECTIFICATION VERSUS REIFICATION
As her article in this Symposium aptly confirms,3 Margaret Radin has contributed 
significantly to a relational view of property.  We derive from this relational 
approach two larger themes.  First, within the legal neighborhood of propertization,4
the character of an item as property is not determined by the item in isolation but in 
weighing and balancing the relations between those who assert to control it and those 
who seek to freely use it.5  Further, this balancing is reassessed in its relation to new 
points of application.6  Second and correlatively, propertized items are never simply 
brute facts whose legal character derives from this facticity.  Instead, their “facticity” 
is intertwined with their legal character, with the policy judgment that balances the 
interests at stake.  As Radin writes, “[F]acts are not ‘out there’ waiting to be 
described by a discourse.  Facts are theory-dependent and value-dependent.”7  The 
relational nature of property and its interrelation of fact and theory are especially 
evident in the changes to property doctrine over time as it is applied to changing 
circumstances.8  As Radin discusses9 and as we shall later probe at greater length,10
this is particularly apparent as the law attempts to deal with new forms of digital 
information.  Old categories are breaking down, and a reconceptualization appears to 
be in progress.11
We want to support and deepen Radin’s analysis here by drawing upon the 
insights of philosopher Paul Ricoeur.  As to the interrelation of theory and fact, 
Ricoeur affirms that it is impossible to separate the two:  a “fact” is always 
interwoven with our conceptualization of it.  “The so-called ‘real’ process [of human 
life and activity],” Ricoeur maintains, “already has a symbolic dimension. . . . [A] 
                                                                
3See id.
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5Id. at 25-27; see also CAROL M. ROSE, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game 
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 27-28 (1994) 
[hereinafter ROSE, Property as Storytelling] (“We often think of property as some version of 
entitlement to things:  I have a right to this thing or that.  In a more sophisticated version of 
property, of course, we see property as a way of defining our relationships with other 
people.”). 
6See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 
(1996) [hereinafter Radin, Property Evolving]. 
7MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 89 (1996). 
8Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 26 
9See, e.g., Radin, Property Evolving, supra note 6. 
10See discussion infra Part III. 
11Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 395, 405 (Ove Granstrand ed., 2003).   
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presymbolic . . . stage of real life can nowhere be found.  Symbolism in general is 
not a secondary effect of social real life; it constitutes real life as socially 
meaningful. . . . . [T]he symbolic function is originary . . . .”12  Elsewhere Ricoeur 
insists that “symbolic systems belong already to the infrastructure, to the basic 
constitution of human being.”13  Human life is symbolically mediated; it is caught in 
an inextricable interpretive web; fact cannot be separated from symbolization. 
A second insight we draw from Ricoeur by way of his heremeneutic predecessor, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer.  This point deepens Radin’s argument that property doctrine 
changes as it is applied in new contexts.  Gadamer famously contends that meaning 
and application are interrelated:  the meaning of a principle is not determined at the 
outset for all time but changes as it is applied in new circumstances.  As Gadamer 
argues, application involves “co-determining, supplementing, and correcting [a] 
principle.”14  Commentator Joel Weinsheimer clarifies that this means that neither 
the interpretive rule “nor the instance to which it is applied is antecedent to the 
other”; their relationship is “reciprocal rather than unilateral.  Each term modifies 
and acts on the other so that they interact.”15  We emphasize here the relational 
nature of meaning:  at the point of application, existing categorization may be broken 
and reformed.  Following Ricoeur, we also characterize the nature of meaning here 
as metaphoric.  Metaphor violates a current order; it transgresses the given order.16
The new circumstance cannot be accommodated without change and so disrupts 
existing doctrine or principles.  Metaphor does not just disorder, though; the process 
of metaphoric as-similation leads to the creation of a new ordering, a transfiguration 
of prior doctrine or principles.17  The relational nature of this metaphoric operation 
deserves emphasis:  metaphor involves not just a word “whose meaning is displaced, 
but the pair of terms or relationships between which the transposition operates.”18
Ricoeur underscores how basic this metaphoric operation may be: 
                                                                
12Paul Ricoeur, Can There be a Scientific Concept of Ideology?, in PHENOMENOLOGY AND 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 44, 51 (Joseph Bien ed., 1978). 
13PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 258 (George H. Taylor ed., 1986) 
[hereinafter RICOEUR, LECTURES].  The reference to the symbolic as infrastructural here is an 
explicit challenge to Marxian orthodoxy where the infrastructure – the basic activity of human 
life – is economic and the symbolic or ideational (which would include law) is merely 
superstructural, that is, derivative from the economic.  See id. at 153-54. 
14HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 39 (1992).   For Gadamer, law is a 
primary exemplification of this interrelation.   See id. at 324-41. 
15JOEL WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY 80 (1991); 
see also JOEL WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS:  A READING OF TRUTH AND 
METHOD 192 (1985) (“[T]he general is . . . continually determined by the particular, even as it 
determines the particular.  Application is not reductive but productive . . . .”). 
16See PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR 21-22 (Robert Czerny trans., 1977) 
[hereinafter RICOEUR, METAPHOR].  This characterization of metaphor as disruptive is quite 
different from other contemporary theories that emphasize the continuity of metaphor from 
source to target domain.  See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
FLESH:  THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999). 
17RICOEUR, METAPHOR, supra note 16, at 22. 
18Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted). 
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[C]ould we not imagine that the process that disturbs and displaces a 
certain logical order, a certain conceptual hierarchy, a certain 
classification scheme, is the same as that from which all classification 
proceeds? . . .  [C]ould we not imagine that the order itself is born in the 
same way that it changes?  Is there not, in Gadamer’s terms, a 
‘metaphoric’ at work at the origin of logical thought, at the root of all 
classification? . . .  The idea of an initial metaphorical impulse destroys 
the[] oppositions between proper and figurative, ordinary and strange, 
order and transgression.  It suggests the idea that order itself proceeds 
from the metaphorical constitution of semantic fields, which themselves 
give rise to genus and species.19
The literal exists within the wider and deeper context of metaphor.  The literal is not 
originary but simply current or usual meaning,20 meaning that can be transformed by 
metaphoric means in the application to new circumstances. 
We would join the symbolic mediation of life discussed earlier with the 
categorial priority granted metaphor here.  Both are elements of a larger metaphoric:  
facts do not exist independent of theorization or conceptualization; categorization 
rests upon a metaphoric impulse.  Radin seems to agree:  “In one sense, there cannot 
be any sharp divide between the literal and the metaphorical, because there is no 
sharp divide between action and discourse—between the nature of a transaction and 
the conceptual scheme or discursive framework in which we understand it.”21
Metaphor is originary, inextricable, and relational.  Recognition of the originary role 
played by metaphor in conceptualization and categorization, we argue, provides 
more substantial support for a relational theory of property.   
Thus far, our argument has been consistent with Radin’s.  There is a side of 
Ricoeur’s analysis of interpretation other than the metaphoric, however, and 
elucidation of that perspective will start to move us away from Radin.  Having 
established the common grounds between us and Radin, we can now begin to 
demarcate our differences, a project that will consume the remainder of our 
Comment.   
Ricoeur argues that interpretation “functions at the intersection of two domains, 
metaphorical and speculative.”22  Speculative discourse establishes the principles 
                                                                
19Id. at 22-23 (footnote omitted) (citing HANS-GEORG GADAMER, WARHHEIT UND 
METHODE 71, 406ff (1960)  [GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 14, at 75, 429 ff]); 
see also id. at 24, 197-98. 
20Id. at 290-91.   This conception of the literal as the usual allows reconciliation of 
Ricoeur’s approach with Wittgenstein’s claim that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is 
not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going 
against it’ in actual cases.”  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS pt.I, ¶ 
201 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968).  Grasping a rule is not an interpretation to the 
extent that the usual use of the rule is available rather than needing to be transformed at the 
point of application.  For application of Wittgenstein’s approach to law, see FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991). 
21RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 2; see also ROSE, PROPERTY AND 
PERSUASION, supra note 5, at 296 (“[S]eeing property is an act of imagination”). 
22RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 16, at 303. 
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“that articulate primordially the space of the concept.”23  Whereas the metaphorical 
domain allows meaning to proliferate at new points of application, speculative 
discourse is reductive, elucidative; it tries to bring order, establish univocity, derive a 
concept.24  Ricoeur aspires to establish an interpretive method responsive to the 
interplay between the two domains.  He seeks, he says, “a hermeneutic style where 
interpretation would conform both to the notion of concept and to that of the 
constitutive intention of the experience seeking to be expressed in the metaphorical 
mode.”25  In his view, then, interpretation is a “composite discourse” that feels “the 
opposite pull of two rival demands”:  the pull on one side toward the concept, the 
pull on the other of metaphor that “hopes to preserve the dynamism of meaning that 
the concept holds and pins down.”26
The question we would like to pursue is whether property interpretation—in 
particular, intellectual property interpretation—can maintain a “composite discourse” 
responsive to both the metaphoric dynamism of meaning and the conceptual and 
doctrinal drive toward univocity.  We argue that although Radin is certainly attentive 
to doctrinal needs, her own relational approach to property may weigh too heavily 
towards the side of metaphor.  In particular, while Radin’s work is noteworthy and 
laudable in its efforts to protect personhood—a dynamic of personal meaning—she 
mistakenly, in our view, maintains that the objectification of personhood or its 
commodification (a subcategory of the former) leads to personhood’s elimination.  
We endeavor to show that objectification—whether of person or of doctrine—is not 
only inevitable but potentially positive.  In this analysis, objectification stands for the 
conceptual side of interpretation’s composite discourse.  In Part III, we turn to 
intellectual property theory and offer considerable doctrinal development of how 
treatment of property as thing or object can at the same time preserve the dynamism 
of meaning on the metaphorical side of interpretation.     
Radin is perhaps best known for her argument that certain qualities of 
personhood should be inalienable in the economic market; to be preserved, they must 
be protected from market exchange and therefore not be commodified.27  Radin 
originally derived her conception of commodification in significant part from 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.28  Our own recontextualization of the perspective 
offered by Radin can be situated by a return to this text.  It is not that Radin’s own 
                                                                
23Id. at 300. 
24Id. at 302.  In the present context, then, we might describe Radin’s original conceptions 
of commodification as more metaphoric—the promulgation of a new way of thinking—and 
the second generation of commodification scholarship as one more of speculative discourse, 
an attempt to think through more critically and analytically what commodification entails.  
This differentiation is, of course, a generalization and is not intended to demean the analytic 
power of Radin’s argument or the creative, metaphoric side of the new scholarship. 
25Id. at 303. 
26Id.
27See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 16-29. 
28See, e.g., id. at 35-40 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. M. 
Knox trans., 1952)).  Radin’s earlier work on personhood also draws upon as it differentiates 
itself from this same text.  See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 44-
48 (1993).
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conception rises or falls to the degree it adheres to Hegel; the rigor and depth of her 
ideas must be assessed on their own terms.  But a return to the Philosophy of Right
provides a useful entrance to our theme, because more seems relevantly at work in 
the text than Radin appeared to suppose.  In paragraph 43, Hegel asks whether the 
attainments of the artist, scholar, or preacher—their “art, erudition, ability to preach 
a sermon,” etc.—are “things.” 
We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c., 
“things”, for while possession of these may be the subject of business 
dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something 
inward and mental about it . . . . Attainments, erudition, talents, and so 
forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and 
not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody them in 
something external and alienate them . . . and in this way they are put into 
the category of “things.”29
We would emphasize in this passage a differentiation between externalization and 
alienation.  As the translator quotes Hegel in a subsequent footnote, “‘Alienation is 
giving up something which is my property and which is already external, it is not to 
externalize.”’30  The alienation of property places it into the market, and Radin builds 
on this in her conception of commodification.  In the extended passage above, it is 
instructive that Hegel is attentive to that which is internal and “owned by free 
mind”—qualities of personhood that are Radin’s concern—but he does not view 
alienation of these qualities as inherently destructive of them.   
We comprehend Hegel’s larger themes in the Philosophy of Right if we 
characterize alienation as a subcategory of externalization.  We want to emphasize 
the role externalization plays in Hegel’s analysis, a theme that Radin does not seem 
sufficiently to attend.  For Hegel, externalization is something positive.  As the 
examples of the scholar, artist, and preacher suggest, their will and person are made 
manifest in externalizations of themselves in their work.  Their art, scholarship, and 
preaching are externalizations or embodiments of themselves.  Who we are inwardly 
needs to be externalized, needs to be expressed outwardly.  The embodiment of the 
will is “an immediate external thing.”31  We must translate our freedom into an 
                                                                
29G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 43  (T. M. Knox trans., 1952) 
(emphasis added).  We do not include in this quotation sections where Hegel seems to equate 
characterization of something as a “thing” with it having legal status, as the subject of 
contracts and so on.  We return later to criticize this equation:  just because something is 
characterized as a “thing” does not tell us necessarily anything about how it should be 
conceived legally.  That remains an interpretive policy judgment.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 124-25.  It is also unclear from Hegel’s passage whether something 
becomes a “thing” because it is externalized or because it is alienated.  As we shall discuss, 
see infra text accompanying notes 31-33, 45-46, we more expansively interpret a “thing” as 
the product of externalization. 
30Id. at 322 n.16 (citation omitted). 
31Id. ¶ 33. 
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“external sphere.”32  The interior self becomes realized or actualized by the process 
of externalization.33
By contrast, Radin reads the relation between will and external sphere not as a 
manifestation of the will in the production of the external but only as the imposition 
of the will on a pre-existent external world.34  For instance, Radin emphasizes 
Hegel’s pronouncement that an individual can alienate—that is, let go of or transfer 
to another—only a “thing external by nature.”35  While Radin views this category as 
that of pre-existent natural things,36 we understand it to exclude only those personal 
attributes that cannot be alienated, such as one’s ethical life or religion.37  Radin 
concludes that “only objects separate from the self are suitable for alienation,”38 and 
this leads, she argues, to an untenable distinction between subject and object, 
between something internal to the person and an external thing—property—that can 
be manipulated and controlled.39  Radin does allow at a couple points that Hegel 
provides that mental creations are “capable of objectification by being 
externalized,”40 but this does not lead her to revise her larger assessment of Hegel.  
As we shall later discuss, this will have unfortunate repercussions in her discussions 
of, for example, intellectual property.  While Radin acknowledges that mental 
products can be externalized and hence are “propertizable,” they are still, she insists, 
not things “external by nature.”  Radin continues:  “The picture of intellectual 
property as an external object becomes more problematic every day, as intellectual 
property comes to exist in a digital world and is not embodied in any objects we can 
point to.”41  As we shall argue, the more positive assessment Hegel provides of the 
externalization of the self into created objects permits a recasting of this problem.   
The positive characterization of externalization found in Hegel is also available 
in the young Marx.  Marx goes beyond Hegel in criticizing the alienation of one’s 
labor to the extent that the process and product of labor are not matters of self-
expression but rather imposed on the laborer from outside.42  Our more customary 
                                                                
32Id. ¶ 41 (“A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as 
Idea.”). 
33See RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 13, at 38-39 (describing the Hegelian approach).
34See RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 45 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL,
supra note 29, ¶ 41). 
35Id. at 195 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, supra note 29, ¶ 65); RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 35 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, supra note 29, ¶ 65) 
36See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 35-37. 
37See G.W.F. HEGEL, supra note 29, ¶ 66.  These attributes are also discussed by Radin, 
but she does not draw the same conclusions as do we.  See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 35-36. 
38RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 34. 
39See id.; Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11, at 397. 
40Radin, Property Evolving, supra note 6, at 511.   
41RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 38. 
42See, e.g., KARL MARX, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 111 
(Dirk J. Struik ed., 1964) [hereinafter MARX, MANUSCRIPTS]. 
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contemporary sense of the term alienated labor derives from this understanding.   
Under these conditions, says Marx, “[l]abor produces not only commodities:  it 
produces itself and the worker as a commodity. . . .”43 When Radin discusses Marx 
as someone totally opposed to commodification,44 this is the Marx to whom she is 
referring.  This process of externalization is negative because alien.  Yet Marx also 
wants to retain a positive concept of externalization, a process that he calls 
“objectification.”  The proper rather than alienated object of labor is “the 
objectification of man’s species life.”45  As Marx comments in another passage, 
“[l]abor’s realization is its objectification.”46  This productive capacity of 
externalization is positive:  “[i]t is life-engendering life.”47  This positive capacity of 
externalization is similar to that in Hegel.  For the early Marx, writes Ricoeur, 
“humanity produces itself . . . by objectifying itself.”48  It may be that this possibility 
of objectification will become known historically only after the alienation of labor is 
eliminated, but, Ricoeur observes, “it is on the assumption of the abolition of 
estrangement that the fundamental concept of objectification is revealed.”49
Radin addresses the alienating form of labor that Marx described.50  “Alienation 
comes about,” she writes, “when attributes of personhood are sundered.”51  For her, 
objectification describes this negative treatment, where people are treated as means 
not ends; attributes of the person become objects—commodities—that may be 
purchased or sold in the economic market.52  Because the person is conceived simply 
as an element of market exchange, commodification reduces the person as subject to 
a thing, an object.53  Throughout her work, Radin admirably wants to analyze how to 
                                                                
43Id. at 107 (emphasis omitted). 
44See RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at xiii (asserting that Marx’s theory 
represents the pole of “universal noncommodification”). 
45MARX, MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 42, at 114 (emphasis omitted). 
46Id. at 108.  He goes on to say that now “[i]n the sphere of political economy this 
realization of labor appears as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as the loss of 
the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation.”  Id. (emphasis 
omitted). 
47Id. at 113. 
48See RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 13, at 44. 
49Id. at 60-61.  As over time in his work Marx moves increasingly to invert Hegel’s 
idealism and maintain a more materialist stance, he nevertheless retains a positive, productive 
sense of human externalization.  Ricoeur argues, for instance, that the concept of self-activity 
discussed in The German Ideology, see, e.g., KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN
IDEOLOGY 92 (C. J. Arthur ed., 1970), preserves from earlier writing “something of the 
concept of objectification, the self-creation of human being.”  RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 
13, at 99.  
50See, e.g., RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 192-93; RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 80. 
51RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 193. 
52RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 156. 
53Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction:  The Subject and Object of 
Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION:  CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND 
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preserve human personhood from this reduction.54  Radin does not argue that market-
exchange is inevitably wrong,55 and “incomplete commodification” allows that an 
action can both preserve personhood and also enter the market to a degree.56  She 
also finds available positive notions of work, although they do not derive from Marx.  
On the one hand, she regards as valuable “the freedom to fuse oneself by one’s 
efforts with the external environment.”57  Note, though, that this is an operation of 
the self on a pre-existing object, not the externalization that creates an object.  On the 
other hand, she does differentiate between (negative) labor and (positive) work:  
“Laborers play [musical] notes, we might say, and workers play the music. . . . 
Money does not . . . exhaust the value of [workers’] activity.”58  Work is in this sense 
constitutive of self and person.59  This characterization of work would seem 
consistent with the positive concept of objectification that we propose:  an 
externalization and actualization of oneself in the music, the art, the craft, or 
potentially many other forms of work.  Yet Radin’s restrictions on the meanings of 
objectification and commodification do not permit as positive a subject’s 
objectification in his or her work.  Work, Radin writes, always contains a 
“noncommodified human element.”60  For us, the issue is not commodification or 
noncommodification but whether the objectification is positive or not.61  Radin by 
                                                          
CULTURE 8, 8 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) [hereinafter Radin & 
Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification].  
54See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 16-29 (developing the 
notion of “market-inalienability”). 
55See id. at xii. 
56See id. at 20. 
57See RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 50.   
58RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 105. 
59Id.
60Id. (emphasis added). 
61This approach seems consistent with and supportive of work by the newer generation of 
commodification theorists.  See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface:  
Freedom, Equality, and the Many Futures of Commodification, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION:  CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 53, at 1, 4  
[hereinafter Ertman & Williams, Preface] (“The new materials in this book, taken as a whole, 
argue against the vision of a world bifurcated into separate hostile spheres whose boundary is 
policed by commodification anxiety.  In fact, intimate relations typically have economic 
dimensions, and market relations often do not adhere to the model of self-interest, and self-
interest alone.”); see also Carol M. Rose, Afterword:  Whither Commodification, in 
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 53, 
at 402, 412 [hereinafter Rose, Afterword] (arguing that commodification may be “norm-
generative” rather than simply “norm-destructive”). 
In an introductory essay to this volume, Radin demonstrates that she is receptive to this 
new scholarship.  She and co-author Madhavi Sunder write that the questions this new 
scholarship raises “remind us that the goal is not commodification or noncommodification, per 
se, but rather . . . a world in which all individuals and groups have rights to make their cultural 
worlds.”  Radin & Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, supra note 53, at 20.  
Our criticism is that Radin does not fully address this theme in her theory of commodification, 
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contrast emphasizes the “personal touch in one’s work,”62 the “personal aspect of 
work,”63 rather than the personhood achieved in the objectification in the work.  At 
the same time that “our culture persistently commodifies and objectifies,” Radin 
maintains, it also “stubbornly insists on conceiving of the person as moral agent, as 
humane subject distinct from the world of objects.”64  Personhood must be protected 
from objectification.  Objectification is the “failure to respect in theory and to make 
space in practice for the human subject.”65  Objectification is the negation of the 
human subject.66  Ironically, while Radin criticizes the dualism that splits subject and 
object,67 it is a dualism that in this regard she herself maintains.
We contend, then, that Radin does not maintain a distinction between positive 
and negative forms of externalization.  Rather than concentrate on whether particular 
types of commodification are good or bad, a more useful distinction may be whether 
externalization is good or bad.  If externalization is good and so a positive form of 
self-actualization, it should be called objectification.  If the externalization is bad in 
the sense that the human expression in the thing or object is stripped away, then it 
should be called alienation or reification.68  We shall prefer to use the term reification 
                                                          
and we go on to argue that attention to externalization and objectification would help to orient 
this reconceptualization.   
62RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 105 (emphasis added).  
63Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
64See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 341, 
343 (1991) [hereinafter Radin, Objectification] (emphasis added). 
65RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 155. 
66Id.
67To be precise, Radin maintains that her project blurs the distinction both between subject 
and object – which “calls to mind the disjunction between persons and things” – and between 
the subjective and the objective – which “calls to mind the disjunction between what is 
‘inside’ the will of a person . . . and what is ‘outside’ in the world of objects . . . .”  RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 9.  As should be apparent, we also attempt to 
break down both of these distinctions, and we argue Radin maintains an inappropriate division 
between subject and its objectification in the object. 
68See, e.g., Paul Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation dans l’Expérience Historique, 45 
ARCHIVIO DI FILOSOFIA 27 (1975) [hereinafter Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation]
(developing the distinction between objectification and alienation).  Ricoeur here equates 
alienation with reification.  See id. at 32.  He also appears to derive the concept of 
objectification independently from Marx, who is not mentioned in this essay.  For further 
development of the concept of alienation, see Paul Ricoeur, Aliénation, 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
UNIVERSALIS 660 (1968). 
We are aware that the term objectification may have a negative connotation in English, as 
it does, for instance, in Radin.  See, e.g., Radin, Objectification, supra note 64.  We retain this 
term because it is the customary one used in positive contexts in English, see supra text 
accompanying notes 45-49 (on Marx), and in most translations of Ricoeur’s usage of the term.  
See infra text accompanying notes 77, 79, 81, 83.  But the French term “objectivation,” see 
supra, may come closer to disclosing what we are after:  a sense of an objectifying process by 
human activity rather than just the object produced, the objectification.   In at least one of his 
articles, Ricoeur’s use of the French term “objectivation” was translated into English by the 
identical term.  See Paul Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics,
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for the negative form of externalization, because the word’s etymology (from the 
Latin res, thing)69 underscores the transformation of something into only a thing.  Its 
human and relational qualities are gone.  To the extent that Radin concludes that 
externalization—whether in the form of objectification or its subcategory 
commodification—is necessarily negative, she seems to be rejecting the relational 
view of fact and value that she otherwise strongly defends.70  Just because something 
is an object or thing, that “facticity” does not make it negative.  Rather, its facticity is 
value-dependent;71 in the present context, the object or thing is negative or positive 
depending on whether it is a positive externalization or not.  In turn, the 
differentiation between positive and negative externalization rests on appreciation 
first of the need for and inevitability of externalization of anything internal, and we 
turn to draw especially on Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to develop this understanding.   
Ricoeur is sympathetic to Radin’s concern for the protection of the inward 
qualities of personhood.  But he insists that we know of these inward qualities by 
their outward externalizations: 
In opposition to . . . the claim of the subject to know itself by immediate 
and direct intuition, we must say that we understand ourselves via the 
detour of the signs of humanity sedimented in the works of culture.  The 
structure of the work is the tool of this sedimentation and therefore also of 
this highly mediated mode of transmission.  What would we know of love 
and hatred – and, in general of the feelings and the values which support 
the Self – if they had not been brought to language and articulated by 
works of art and discourse?  The texture of the text is the bearer of this 
mediation.72
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is predicated upon the claim that we understand the self, 
others, actions, or history not by intuition but through the marks or signs they 
display.73  These marks or signs are exteriorizations; they are texts and texts that 
need to be interpreted.  The exteriorization of signs—e,g., gestures, dance, language, 
                                                          
5 STUDIES IN RELIGION SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES 14, 18 (1975-76) (Can.) [hereinafter Ricoeur, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics].
69See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1210 (1994). 
70See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
71RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 89. 
72Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 30; see also PAUL RICOEUR, THE 
CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS 327 (Don Ihde ed., 1974) (“The first truth—I think, I am—
remains as abstract and empty as it is unassailable.  It must be ‘mediated’ by representations, 
actions, works, institutions, and monuments which objectify it . . . .”) (second emphasis 
added).
73This emphasis in Ricoeur marks a signal departure of his hermeneutics from that of 
Gadamer’s.  Gadamer views objectification as necessarily alienating, and he critiques the 
method of the human sciences as alienating because objectifying.  See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR,
The Task of Hermeneutics, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 43, 60 (John B. 
Thompson ed. & trans., 1981) (exploring this distinction); Ricoeur, Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 14. 
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and so on74—is the first condition for the understanding of another, and these signs 
are a text that we must interpret.75  Writing is possible because discourse itself 
presents a form of exteriorization that permits its inscription in a material medium.76
Action is textual in its objectification or exteriorization that is similar to the fixation 
that occurs in writing.77  Our belonging to traditions must pass through “the 
interpretation of the signs, works and texts in which cultural heritages are inscribed 
and offer themselves to be deciphered.”78  Communication of these past heritages 
therefore occurs under the condition of their objectification.79  Radin argues that “it is 
hard to see our work, either physical or intellectual, as belonging intrinsically . . . to 
the object realm.”80  By contrast, Ricoeur insists that exteriorization or objectification 
is an ineluctable element of human activity;81 it is as primitive and radical—that is, to 
the root—as possible.82  The relationship between objectification and interpretation is 
not dichotomous but complementary.83  Hermeneutics wants to identify within the 
work what the text is trying to say, but “this discourse is given nowhere else than in
                                                                
74For an exploration of how these activities may assume forms of legal expression in 
various cultures, see Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to Our Senses”:  Communication and 
Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873 (1992). 
75Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation, supra note 68, at 34-35 (citing Dilthey).   
76Id. at 35. 
77PAUL RICOEUR, The Model of the Text:  Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in
HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 73, at 197, 203 (action as 
objectification); Paul Ricoeur, Explanation and Understanding, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL 
RICOEUR 149, 160 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart eds., 1978) (action as exteriorization).  
As with discourse, action’s exteriorization permits its subsequent inscription in archives and 
documents. Id.
Analogy can be properly drawn here to the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz.  See 
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973).  Geertz’s concept of culture is 
semiotic.  See id. at 5.  The “thick description” of cultural meaning that is his aspiration, see, 
e.g., id. at 7, he explicitly analogizes to interpreting a literary text.  See id. at 448. “[C]ultural 
forms can be treated as texts, as imaginative works built out of social materials . . . .”  Id. at 
449.  Geertz makes plain that he borrows the idea of the inscription of action from Ricoeur.  
See id. at 19.  Radin also cites Geertz but not to similar effect.  See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 83; Radin & Sunder, The Subject and Object of 
Commodification, supra note 53, at 26 n.33. 
78RICOEUR, The Task of Hermeneutics, supra note 73, at 62. 
79Paul Ricoeur, Ethics and Culture, in POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ESSAYS 243, 264 (David 
Stewart & Joseph Bien eds., 1974). 
80RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 38. 
81Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation, supra note 68, at 27. 
82Id. at 35. 
83Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 19; Paul Ricoeur, The
Hermeneutical Task of Distanciation, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra
note 73, at 131, 140. 
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and by the structure of the work.”84  For our purposes, it is also provocative that 
Gadamer calls what the text is trying to say the “thing” of the text.85
A second level of exteriorization takes us beyond the objectification of 
personhood in individual outward expressions or actions to the objectification that 
may be operable in a larger discourse, theory, story, or doctrine.  Consider Radin’s 
many writings, for example.  They are all exteriorizations and objectifications of 
herself and the ideas and arguments she wants to express.  Ricoeur comments, 
“[D]iscourse displays a quite high level of objectification, similar to that of the 
products of work in relation to the process of production.  Man objectifies himself 
through the works of his discourse, as he does through the products of his 
craftsmanship, and his art.”86  Part of our aim here is again to draw attention, now at 
the level of discourse, to how exteriorization or objectification can be positive and 
worth preserving.  We also want to go further, though, to evaluate how Radin’s 
method, in its discussion of policy and doctrine, falls along the spectrum between the 
poles of metaphoric and speculative or conceptual discourse.  We argue that although 
Radin demonstrates some sensitivity to and adherence to more conceptual discourse, 
she typically aligns with more metaphoric discourse.  She only limitedly endorses 
conceptual discourse, because it is more objectifying.  We will turn in Part III to 
contend that in intellectual property law, objectifying discourse can be more positive 
and less reifying than Radin allows. 
The poles of metaphoric and conceptual discourse can be well represented by 
Carol Rose’s distinction in property law between crystalline rules and muddy ones.87
Crystal rules are “hard-edged,” or in our vocabulary reductive and univocal; they are 
imposed regardless of context.88  Muddy rules, by contrast, are attentive to context; 
they are more relational, more metaphoric.  They are more discretionary, equitable 
judgments.89  In her review of various property doctrines, Rose finds a cycle that 
“alternates between crystals and mud.”90
Radin’s analyses encompass both more metaphoric and more conceptual forms of 
discourse.  Her theory of personhood, for example, appreciates both the need for 
stability and flexibility.  “For appropriate self-constitution,” she writes, “both strong 
attachment to context and strong possibilities for detachment from context are 
needed.”91  Regard for more ideal theories of personhood—of freedom and 
identity—is appropriate, yet, she continues: “[A]s a pragmatist, I believe nonideal 
theory is also necessary, because our visions about the nature of human beings and of 
                                                                
84Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 22. 
85See id. at 30 (describing how Gadamer calls the “what” of the text “die Sache des Texts,
the ‘thing,’ the ‘issue at stake’ in the text, the in re of the text”).  No specific reference to 
Gadamer is provided. 
86Id. at 21.   
87See CAROL M. ROSE, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION,
supra note 5, at 199. 
88See id. at 199. 
89See id. at 200. 
90Id. at 205. 
91RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 61. 
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the good life for human beings cannot be too far divorced from the circumstances 
that give rise to those visions . . . .”92  The pragmatic element in Radin’s analyses is 
the strongest, and her very attentiveness to context and circumstance places her more 
toward the relational, metaphoric end of discourse.  This relational emphasis 
pervades her work.  She writes of her pragmatism:  “A serious pluralism . . . makes 
possible a commitment to dialogue among alternative conceptions.”93  Truth, she 
writes elsewhere, “may not be some absolute value apart from the debate; but truth 
may still be conceived to be the end result of unconstrained conversation.”94  As we 
have previously discussed,95 Radin’s contribution in the present Symposium is full of 
relational language.  “[W]hat counts as property is malleable.”96  Various aspects of 
property are contested.97  Property interests must be balanced.98  Property doctrine—
the “propertization neighborhood”—must itself be interrelated to other doctrinal 
neighborhoods so that is “aware of its function within the city as a whole.”99
Yet within this generally relational approach of Radin’s, we want to return to the 
possibilities she permits of doctrinal and theoretical objectification.  She and Frank 
Michelman write that at the same time that they reject the formalist conception of 
rules, their pragmatism also leads them to reject claims that “all notions of ruleness 
are misleading, all pretenses of ruleness misdirected.”100  It is inappropriate simply to 
decide on the basis of “case-by-case judgment, situated decisionmaking moment by 
moment.”101  This kind of “[r]adical particularism is incomplete pragmatism because 
it shirks the hard pragmatic work of calibrating ruleness to context.”102  While it may 
be true that “each and every normative project is liable to deconstruction,” it is also 
the case that “the reconstructive moment seems ineradicable.”103  Writing in this 
Symposium, Radin endorses the need for “coherence across doctrinal, policy, and 
practical boundaries.”104  She wants to achieve a “satisfactory kind of analysis.”105
                                                                
92Id. at 63. 
93Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1725-
26 (1990). 
94RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 166. 
95See supra text accompanying notes 4-11. 
96Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 23. 
97Id. at 24. 
98Id. at 25-27. 
99Id. at 23. 
100Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Commentary, Pragmatist and 
Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1046 (1991). 
101Id.
102Id.
103Id. at 1057-58. 
104Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 27. 
105Id. at 38. 
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Elsewhere Radin supports the role that “conceptual transformations” can play.106
She appreciates that regulation discouraging commodification would underwrite “a 
conceptual structure.”107  She approves making “policy decisions that take into 
account our vision of the whole, however extraordinarily difficult that may be.”108
Reconstruction, coherence, analysis, conceptual transformation, conceptual 
structure, and visions of the whole are all analytic and conceptual moves that 
objectify; they direct and constrain; they do not let metaphor run free.109  In the midst 
of her relational approach, Radin allows that this approach also needs analytic rigor 
and precision; judgment is not simply situational, simply protean.110  This 
interrelation of the metaphoric or relational and the conceptual or analytic is similar 
to what we endorsed in the earlier pages on externalization.  Conceptual 
objectification is not a negative.  It may also be ineluctable.  Across the spectrum 
from metaphoric to speculative discourse, the reach of the conceptual or analytic is 
far.  Ricoeur writes, for example:  “[T]o narrate is already to explain.”111  A narrative 
is a construct; the “facts” do not present their own story.  Even stable metaphors 
constrain and orient us in certain ways.112
If conceptual or doctrinal objectification is not the enemy, then part of the task is 
to ascertain in differing contexts how various sorts of objectification – from narrative 
to rule – can serve various conceptual, policy, and legal goals.113  Part of the task also 
                                                                
106Radin, Objectification, supra note 64, at 341. 
107RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 176; see also id. at 173 (noting how 
“it seems that the state is always involved in preferring one discourse to another”). 
108Radin, Objectification, supra note 64, at 344.  Likewise, she maintains that a vision of 
the whole will change as particular policy decisions are made.  See id.  This interplay of whole 
and part is analogous to the hermeneutic interrelation of meaning and application, discussed 
earlier.  See supra text accompanying notes 14-15. 
109Cf. RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 16, at 261 (“Philosophical discourse 
sets itself up as the vigilant watchman overseeing the ordered extensions of meaning; against 
this background, the unfettered extensions of meaning in poetic discourse spring free.”). 
110Think analogously of how Ertman & Williams situate their edited collection of new 
scholarship on commodification:  “In the belief that the right tool is half the job, we hope that 
this book will help crystallize a new approach to commodification.”   Ertman & Williams, 
Preface, supra note 61, at 5.  A tool is analytic.  Note also the reference to crystallization, 
which likely unintentionally recalls Rose’s use of the term.  See supra text accompanying note 
88.
1111 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 178 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer 
trans., 1984). 
112Recent work in cognitive theory argues that the structured conceptual systems in the 
mind such as metaphor not only “make it possible for us to experience things the way we do,” 
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 509, but their commonality and stability help account 
for how stable knowledge is possible.  Id. at 96.  For elaboration of the differences between 
the theories of metaphor of Ricoeur and of Lakoff and Johnson, see George H. Taylor, 
Cognitive Theory, Conscience, and Law, 6 GRAVEN IMAGES (forthcoming 2006). 
113The work of Carol Rose, for example, analyzes why property discussions resort to 
narrative rather than exclusively more scientific analytic approaches.  See ROSE, supra note 5, 
at 27. 
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is to differentiate conceptual and doctrinal objectification from conceptual and 
doctrinal reification.  In Part III, we turn to examples from intellectual property to 
discuss and elaborate more concretely this distinction, but let us close this Part and 
introduce the next by way of an example of Radin’s that illustrates the issue.  In a 
recent article on Information Tangibility,114 Radin expresses concern that 
“[a]ssimilation of information to the category of tangibility is fostering 
commodification; that is, a great increase in the scope of intellectual property and 
allied regimes of privatized information control.”115  According to Radin, the 
traditional understanding of intellectual property is that it is composed of something 
internal to a person that becomes propertizable when embodied in an external, 
tangible object.116  Commodification was “linked to embodiment in a physical 
object.”117  Whatever our cautions about Radin’s portrayal of this understanding,118
which she relates back to Kant and Hegel,119 we attend here Radin’s claim that this 
traditional understanding no longer operates in the digital world.  There has been a 
movement to delete recognition of digital information as a product of personhood 
and to “redescribe the information itself as a physical object from the outset.”120
Many courts and commentators have accepted that a computer memory’s 
arrangement of electrons is not intangible information but a tangible physical object, 
and this has led to many online activities being copyrighted that were not similarly 
protected offline.121  For Radin, as we have come to expect, her larger objection is 
that the more information can be assimilated to objects, the more it is susceptible to 
commodification.122  We again wonder, though, whether objectification is the 
primary issue or whether instead reification is.  Digital information has lost its 
relation to its origin as human expression, human externalization.  Although her 
resulting analysis differs from ours, she captures the problem neatly:  “The metaphor 
of physicality, of object-ness, has become ever more rhetorically literal.”123  The 
reduction of the phenomenon to the literal reifies the phenomenon, cuts it off from its 
roots.  More generally, the issue should not be that something is propertizable 
because of its objectification as a thing or object but is propertized because of 
normative judgments about how to conceptualize the thing or object.124  There may 
be rhetorical power in assimilating something to the physical, but the rhetorical 
                                                                
114See Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11. 
115Id. at 397.  This concern is also apparent in her article in the present volume.  See
Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2. 
116Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11, at 398. 
117Id. at 406. 
118See supra text accompanying notes 34-41. 
119See Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11, at 397-98. 
120Id. at 417. 
121Id. at 406. 
122Id. at 417. 
123Id. at 402. 
124See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (discussing the interrelation of fact and value). 
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nature of the claim should be the point of examination.125  As we now turn to pursue 
through examples drawn from intellectual property law, the issue is not whether 
something is externalized and objectified but whether that objectification turns into 
reification.126
III.  TOWARD AN ACCOUNT OF OBJECTIFICATION AND BOUNDARIES
In this Part, we want to relate this understanding of Radin’s work on 
commodification, enhanced via application of Ricoeur’s perspective, briefly to more 
recent work on commodification and to Radin’s recent work on property theory and 
technology.  More generally, we note that the problem that commodification theory 
describes, the problem of things, and signs, and interpretation, describes a problem 
of salience and permeability.  What we describe is, as it is for Radin, essentially a 
problem of boundaries, that is, the problem of distinguishing between those “things” 
that we value and want to promote, and those “things” that we abhor.   
Within commodification theory itself, scholars have come to recognize the 
virtues of things.  Carol Rose, in her afterword to the recent volume Rethinking 
Commodification: Cases And Readings In Law And Culture,127 writes: 
Things are both commodities and not commodities.  Markets seem 
inappropriate for some things, but then again, maybe markets are pretty 
useful for exactly the same things.  It is interesting that several of the 
essays in this volume return to some of Appadurai’s ideas about 
“commoditization” (awkward language and all), and particularly to the 
idea that over time, things slip in and out of the status of commodity.  But 
when? And when not?  This is the set of questions that the new 
commodification theory seems to be addressing.128
                                                                
125See ROSE, supra note 5, at 297: 
With property, the nature of “things” imposes their own quite fascinating constraints.  
Yet even with those, what you see in property is what you and others have talked 
yourselves into about those “things”; and given some imagination, you may always 
talk yourselves into seeing something else – with all the effects on understanding and 
action that a new “envisioning” may bring.  
126For brief consideration of the further fruitfulness of an analysis of the interrelations 
between metaphor, objectification, and reification, consider its implications for an analysis of 
the sociology of organizations.  It is a considerable question, for instance, how institutions can 
maintain their originative ethos or vision over time rather than become focused simply on self-
perpetuation.  David Kennedy has recently examined this problem in the context of 
international human rights organizations.  See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE
(2004).  The classical treatment of this issue can be found in Max Weber’s discussion of the 
bureaucratic routinization of charisma.  See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1121-23 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).  In our vocabulary, the question here can be 
expressed as how the institution’s originative metaphoric impulse can be objectified rather 
than reified.  Arthur Mitzman types Weber’s work precisely a “sociology of reification.”  
ARTHUR MITZMAN, THE IRON CAGE:  AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF MAX WEBER 176 
(1969).
127Rose, Afterword, supra note 53. 
128Id. at 404. 
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Radin’s co-authored contribution to that book likewise acknowledges the complexity 
of modern problems of commodification and the virtues of markets,129 recognizing 
the semiotic significance of things, and how that significance not only charges 
markets with the conditions of victimhood, but may offer tools for escape.  In that 
piece Radin is skeptical of the normativity of things, even while commodification 
may be strategically useful.  But her paper for this symposium seems to be more 
sympathetic to the normative argument.  The question is in part, as she argues, who 
controls the meaning of the thing.  When Radin recognizes that the problem of 
property does not have a single valence that might be described as “commodification 
[and markets] bad” and calls for situating propertization problems in a community of 
zones that includes competition and free speech “neighborhoods,” the point is not 
merely descriptive.   
We propose, however, a broader form of the question, and a form that is, perhaps, 
less susceptible of response along a single dimension.  The question is not only who 
controls the meaning of the thing, but how that meaning is created.  The 
“neighborhood” metaphor evokes a broader discussion about the character of 
neighborhoods, both real and metaphorical.  How do we identify a “neighborhood,” 
and how do we ordinarily understand its various relationships—with other 
neighborhoods, with its inhabitants, with the city or broader community of which it 
is a part?  Our inner “urban planner” has much to say on all of these questions, but 
we want to preface this by grounding the discussion in terms of a distinction drawn 
by Isaiah Berlin.  Berlin described two fundamentally different roles, or identities, 
though which individuals understand the world.  On the one hand, there are the 
systematizers, for whom knowledge proceeds from what might be called 
“universalizing rationalism,” grand, orderly systems that organize human endeavor 
based on rules and their application.130  On the other hand, there are the humanists, 
for whom knowledge proceeds not from rigorous application of method, but from 
understanding.  The stuff of our lived experience—empathy, rhetoric, and practice—
is also the stuff of knowledge.  Working out the relationship between the relational 
and objectification, and describing and applying an appropriate set of tools for doing 
so, requires some careful accommodation of both perspectives.  It isn’t the case that 
there is a single, overarching, and preferred method for balancing the two arguments 
for property that Radin describes in her contribution to this symposium, the Demand 
Side/Column A and the Supply Side/Column B.131  Nor is it the case that any 
question of balancing involves an unbounded inquiry into public policies, where the 
parties fight over the “right” set of policies to consider and the “right” level of 
abstraction to use in the debate. Rather, we describe a series of interconnected 
themes that we draw from the stuff of law itself, themes that law and policy can use 
                                                                
129Radin & Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, supra note 53. 
130See ISAIAH BERLIN, The Divorce Between the Sciences and the Humanities, in AGAINST 
THE CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 80 (1979); ISAIAH BERLIN, Vico’s Concept of 
Knowledge, in AGAINST THE CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 111 (1979); ISAIAH 
BERLIN, Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment, in AGAINST THE CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE 
HISTORY OF IDEAS 120 (1979); ISAIAH BERLIN, The Concept of Scientific History, in CONCEPTS 
AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 103 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979); ISAIAH BERLIN, VICO
AND HERDER: TWO STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1976). 
131Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 25-27. 
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and has used in a number of contexts to process problems of objectification and 
interpretation, that is, control of meaning and the boundary problem at the core of 
commodification theory.   
In brief, those themes are: (i) metaphor, language and symbol, rooted in the 
related disciplines of cognitive psychology, on the one hand, and the hermeneutic 
principles of interpretation described in the last Part, on the other; (ii) narrative and 
storytelling, which also embraces some aspects of ritual and community, i.e., 
propertization’s social milieu, in addition to its legal and economic milieu; (iii) the 
domain of objects, that is, the thingness of things constructed by and for the law;  
(iv) space and place, which we understand as including both the metaphorically and 
literally physical or spatial character of social and legal relations; and (v) discipline 
and social practice, or, in other words, forms of collective understanding and 
behavior.  None of these is truly independent of the others.  All of them are rooted, at 
one level or another, in concerns of metaphor and concept as well as in experience 
and pragmatics.  They are each systematic in a sense, yet simultaneously based in 
and constructed from the everyday.  At the same time, none of them, or even all of 
them taken together, is a complete answer to the problem posed by the distinction 
between commodification and objectification.  We offer them tentatively, as 
possibilities for further exploration and research. 
A. On Metaphor and Language132
The first and perhaps most important source of differentiation is language itself.  
“Commodification” and “commoditization,” “thing-ness” and “thingy-ness” and 
“thingification” are difficult terms, but they capture something imperative about our 
experience of the world.133  We argue that language is essentially metaphorical,134
and that metaphors are not merely literary, but cognitive.135  Language maps deep 
cognitive structures and thus mirrors cultural patterns and social structures.136  We 
                                                                
132Some of this material was presented previously in Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). 
133See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 
(1999); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359, 384-85 (2001). 
134See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES 
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE
BY (1980); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO 
POETIC METAPHOR (1989).
135See MARK TURNER, COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 144-45, 159-62 (2001) 
(describing the functions of conceptual schema in thought and action); Paul DiMaggio, 
Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263, 269-74 (1997) (describing a tentative 
synthesis of cognitive arguments in sociology that conclude that behavior results from 
interaction between external rituals and internal mental structures). 
136See Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 
1197, 1208-10 (2001).  On the role of metaphor in shaping the law, see generally ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 189-92 (2000) (describing the Supreme 
Court's repetitive use of a new word in different contexts until its meaning is shaped).  The 
influence of classification on institutional behavior can’t be ignored; creation, interpretation, 
and application of metaphor is an iterative process.  See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, CONCEPTS
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talk as we do because of how we think and act, rather than the reverse.137
Linguistically, our categories are built largely on our experiences.   
George Lakoff proposes that metaphoric meanings are mapped to experience on a 
one-to-one target (metaphor) to source (experience) basis.  Gilles Fauconnier and 
Mark Turner elaborate this thesis, arguing that we experience overlapping 
metaphorical frameworks.138  Each of these frameworks comprises a "mental space" 
constructed by a listener or reader and consisting of elements, roles, strategies, and 
relationships, all of which the listener uses in reasoning and creating meaning.  
Overlapping "mental spaces" are linked via the process of "cognitive blending," 
which accommodates dynamism in the process of understanding.139  Querying the 
extent and stability of a linguistic practice is a way of decoding the extent and 
stability of the corresponding behavior and social practice.  Moreover, that 
investigation inevitably has both descriptive and normative dimensions.140  Our use 
of metaphor carries with it an evaluative dimension that is always at least implicit.  
In large part, to bring metaphor and language into the foreground of the boundary 
distinguishing commodity from object is to make that evaluation explicit. 
Armed with this perspective, we can see the work of language and metaphor in 
legal analysis all around us.  Radin’s contribution frames her discussion in terms of 
neighborhoods and cities, a metaphorical mapping of legal doctrine onto physical 
territory.  The neighborhood metaphor is not the only one at hand, however, even if 
physical metaphors are deeply embedded in our thinking about property.  Managers 
in businesses deal with disciplinary single-mindedness, but they often refer to the 
problem as one of “silos” rather than as one of “neighborhoods.”  Edward Rubin has 
explored the role of metaphor in law in a number of different contexts.  In corporate 
law, he observes that our metaphoric “image” of the corporation affects our 
presumptions about the character of corporate regulation.141  In administrative law, 
                                                          
AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Henry Hardy ed., 1979); GEOFFREY BOWKER &
SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999). 
137LAKOFF, supra note 134, at 135. 
138See Mark Turner & Gilles Fauconnier, Laughing At and Laughing With: The Linguistics 
of Humor and Humor in Literature, in THE WORKINGS OF LANGUAGE: FROM PRESCRIPTIONS TO 
PERSPECTIVES 181, 186-99 (Rebecca S. Wheeler ed., 1999). 
139See GILLES FAUCONNIER, MENTAL SPACES: ASPECTS OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION IN 
NATURAL LANGUAGE 16-22 (1985); GILLES FAUCONNIER, MAPPINGS IN THOUGHT AND 
LANGUAGE 21-23, 149-92 (1997); Turner & Fauconnier, supra note 138, at 186-89. 
140See id. at 65 ("We not only import entities and structure from the source domain to the 
target domain, we also carry over the way we evaluate the entities in the source domain."); 
Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2002) 
(arguing that "the aesthetic pertains to the forms, images, tropes, perceptions, and sensibilities 
that help shape the creation, apprehension, and even identity of human endeavors, including, 
most topically, law"); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, 
and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1143-46 (1989). 
141Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regulation, 6 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 347, 363 (2005). 
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Rubin argues the traditional hierarchical metaphor of governance should be replaced 
by the more descriptively accurate “network” model.142
The metaphoric approach is equally significant when we move from broad 
regulatory metaphors to more precise applications of metaphor to legal doctrine.  
Radin repeats the common criticism of the use of physicalist metaphors in legislation 
and judicial decisions applying intellectual property rules to the internet, in the 
context of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, for example, and the curious 
contemporary application of the doctrine of trespass to chattels.143  It is important to 
recognize, however, that the metaphor does not necessarily stand in the way here.  
Because of its centrality to our ordinary experience, metaphor can be an important 
tool for progressive analysis.  In intellectual property law, James Boyle has 
championed a call for “cultural environmentalism” on the Internet,144 a theme that 
manifests itself in concrete proposals to preserve (and conserve) a “commons,” 
which is metaphorically related to but distinct from the public domain.  Boyle’s 
“environmentalism” is in the first place a product, not a driver, of a shared sense that 
intellectual property issues pose problems of inter-generational resource allocation 
and stewardship, for example.  To speak of an object as a thing or as a commodity, is 
not necessarily to construct a category for political and legal rhetoric.  It may be to 
introduce our actual experience into the policy debate. 
The problem of the “commons” in intellectual property law is precisely the sort 
of problem that discerning the boundary between “good” and “bad” objectification is 
designed to investigate.  The most recent example of the metaphoric approach to this 
relationship, in the context of the commons, is the inquiry by the United States 
Copyright Office into the problem of what are now universally referred to as 
“orphan” works.145  “Orphan” works are copyrighted works whose owners can no 
longer be found.  The familial metaphor is not original to this inquiry; there is a long 
custom in intellectual property law and among authors themselves of both believing 
that books and other expressive works are the “children” of their creators and 
referring to those works accordingly.146  Creators, like parents, have the presumptive 
right to control the experience of their “children” in the world and to shield them 
from exploitation and abuse, and advocates for strong authorial rights implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly invoke that emotional bond to justify a legislative or judicial 
result.147  On the other hand, the metaphor is regarded as offering a poor fit for 
American copyright law, since it is often invoked in support of forms of “moral 
                                                                
142EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE 
MODERN STATE (2005).
143 Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 34-36. 
144James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Winter/Spring 2003); James Boyle, A Politics of 
Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997). 
145U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/orphan/. 
146The cartoonist Gary Larson invoked the metaphor in a famous attempt to retrieve copies 
of “The Far Side” cartoons from early websites.  The episode is described in William W. 
Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1221-22 (1998). 
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rights” – rights of attribution of the work, and of integrity of the work – that are only 
weakly represented in American law.   
The recent Copyright Office report, however, uses that metaphor in a more 
progressive sense.  Having recognized the metaphor, the office explicitly adopts its 
normative implications:  If copyrighted works implicitly have “parents,” rather than 
authors and publishers, the “orphan” label is consistent with viewing the orphan 
works problem much as child welfare advocates view the problem of abandoned and 
abused children.  The policy problem here is that new users of those works may 
propose valuable uses but be discouraged from pursuing them, out of fear that 
publicity accompanying the use will lead the disappeared owners to emerge and 
demand supra-market compensation, and even injunctive relief.  The Office 
produced a report that explicitly recognized the problem in “orphan” terms and that 
proposed a concrete remedy:  a legislative fix that would limit remedies available to 
newly-appearing owners of truly “orphan” works.   The proposal may or may not suit 
all claims equally, but it is clear that the metaphor offers a useful frame for analyzing 
the issue.  
B. On Stories148
It is important to begin with language and metaphor, but not to end with it.  
Experience may produce language, but our use of metaphor is interpretive and 
iterative, even if individual words and phrases evoke meaning that expresses our 
experience in a direct way.  Equally important, describing the problem of boundaries 
as a problem of language obscures not only the identity of the persons or groups 
whose experiences matter, but also the mechanism by which those experiences get 
inscribed linguistically.  Supplementing the linguistic perspective with others 
becomes critical. 
Most of us create meanings for our lives by blending experience and metaphor 
into stories.  Narrative, then, supplies a second tool for approaching the distinction 
between commodity and object.  We focus on narrative in two distinct, but related, 
senses.  First, there is the modern academic sense of "narrative" as a social construct 
that integrates diverse phenomena into some meaningful, if necessarily incomplete, 
whole.149  This is partly Robert Cover's nomos,150 and it is also importantly what 
Martha Nussbaum commended as an act of "literary imagination."151  In law, 
                                                                
148The material in this Section is drawn in part from Michael J. Madison, The Narratives 
of Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from Casablanca), 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249 (2004). 
149The relationships among law, literature and narrative form a rich field of scholarly 
inquiry.  Scholars urging critical examination of jurisprudence from literary, aesthetic and/or 
narrative perspectives include: MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER 
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150See Cover, supra note 149, at 4-5. 
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narrative permits us to both see the world as it is, by structuring apparently disparate 
phenomena, and perhaps to understand or imagine, as a writer might do, the world as 
it might be.152
There is also, of course, the related and powerful sense of "narrative" as story, as 
a tale that has power and relevance because it has a beginning, a middle and an end.  
In this context, metaphor is this Aristotelian narrative,153 rather than Platonic essence.  
We ask, for example, what is the story of the copyrighted work whose author cannot 
be located, rather than “is this an orphan work”?  Theoretical constructs, metaphors 
and technologies, that is, commodities and objects, become characters, settings, 
themes and plots.154
Where do we find these narratives, or how do we construct them?  Narrative 
requires the same tools that metaphor supplies:  our lived experience, with character, 
and movement, and boundaries.  Even the online world, with its apparent boundless-
ness,155 supplies these things in a growing variety of ways, linear and traditional as 
well as non-linear and unconventional.  Cyberspace is determined and bounded by 
the processes by which it is created and experienced.  The boundaries of cyberspace 
are recursive, generated dynamically both via human engagement and via 
technological processes, and constantly re-determined.  Boundaries do exist, if in a 
non-traditional sense, at the levels of software and communications protocols that 
enable digital communication and at the level of computer software that we engage 
as users.156  We can, as a result, tell both traditional and non-traditional stories about 
law.157  Stories are determined recursively by the processes of their telling and re-
telling.  The reader is merely establishing one pattern from among a large number of 
patterns whose potential is embedded in the technology.  Traditional text-based 
narratives are historically contingent instantiations of a cognitive framework for the 
recognition of meaning in context.  The narrative construct does not depend on a 
                                                                
152ARISTOTLE: POETICS 516, at 59 (Stephen Halliwell ed. & trans., 1995): 
[I]t is not the poet's function to relate actual events, but the kinds of things that might 
occur and are possible in terms of probability or necessity. The difference between the 
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153Cf. PAUL RICOEUR, 1 TIME AND NARRATIVE 31- 51 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David 
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154See Michael J. Madison, Where Does Creativity Come From? and Other Stories of 
Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747 (2003). 
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157 See Shulamit Almog, From Sterne and Borges to Lost Storytellers: Cyberspace, 
Narrative, and Law, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002).  
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particular technology.158  There are many beginnings and many ends, rather than one 
of each.  The reader or user chooses and, in doing so, selects the boundaries of his or 
her own experience.   
What this describes from a socio-technical perspective obviously stands in 
metaphorically for what happens in law.159  We can differentiate commodities from 
objects, bad things from good things, in part by explicitly explaining, exploring, and 
contrasting the narratives that can be constructed out of them.  We cannot do this 
comprehensively before the fact, that is, as a way of categorizing something ex ante
as one form or another.  Instead, we rely on narrative after the fact to validate the 
synthesis that we think is both pragmatically and morally correct. 
Carol Rose shows that narrative methodology can be applied in property law 
contexts at almost any level of abstraction, and that it can be used predictively and 
instrumentally as well as symbolically.160  In intellectual property law, a particularly 
clear example comes from the recent debate over the lawfulness of “file sharing” or 
“peer-to-peer” (P2P) technologies for distributing computer files on the internet.  
Today, that debate is framed by a case decided more than 20 years ago, involving the 
lawfulness of the videocassette recorder.  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios161 the Supreme Court upheld distribution of the VCR over the challenge that 
the machine enabled widespread copyright infringement by home users making 
unauthorized recordings of broadcast television programs.  Those home users, a 
majority of the Court concluded, were engaged in lawful “time-shifting” of 
television shows by recording them for later viewing.  As subsequent commentators 
have often pointed out, however, not only was the evidence of “time-shifting” by 
VCR users far more equivocal than the Court acknowledged, but Sony, the 
manufacturer and defendant in the case, had marketed the machines for use in taping 
and archiving favorite television programs.  One might conclude, with only a bit of 
rhetorical excess, that the story of the case proved to be more persuasive than the 
facts.
Today, the Sony precedent is the starting point for evaluation of P2P file sharing 
networks, such as Napster, Aimster, and Grokster.  Defenders of those networks 
                                                                
158JOSEPH TABBI, COGNITIVE FICTIONS xi (2002) ("A similar interdependence [between the 
individual and the environment], through which a bounded and stable structure is continually 
produced, might better describe what is actually going on within today's changing media 
environment."); see also George H. Taylor, Critical Hermeneutics: The Intertwining of 
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159See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
311, 321-22 (2002) (attempting to rethink jurisdictional questions in terms of dynamic 
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have suffered in copyright litigation at least in large part because they have yet to 
develop a narrative as persuasive as the story that “time-shifting” told.162  Time-
shifting for television programming has been neologized to “space-shifting” of other 
entertainment media, the idea being that a consumer who pays once for a permanent 
copy of a song or a motion picture should be entitled to listen to or watch that 
content on any available, compatible device.  The “shifting” here is obviously 
metaphorical.  So far, the courts (with one small exception) have not recognized the 
legitimacy of the attempted narratival transfer.163  Right now, the story of free P2P 
networks can be reduced to a single, alternative story:  theft.
The important lesson to be reaffirmed here is that metaphor and narrative do not 
simply happen.  They are parts and products of our own lives.  Advocates rely on 
narratives to help their clients; policymakers rely on narratives to advance agendas.  
The variety of our experience and the flexibility of technology suggest that we can 
design our own narratives.164  Articulation and distinction, and boundaries and 
permeability, in Radin’s sense of neighborhood, often lie within our own control.165
C. On Objects166
The insidiousness of accepting objects uncritically lies in accepting how things 
mask legal and power relations within groups, between groups and individuals, and 
between individuals.  This is the evil of reification, and in the world of digital 
networks and biotechnology, there is a considerable risk that conceptual reification 
of the legal thing (or what Margaret Radin referred to as “conceptual severance”167)
                                                                
162See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) 
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164See Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (on 
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44 (2005).
166Some material in this Section is drawn in part from Madison, Law as Design, supra
note 1. 
167Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676-79 (1988). 
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will be replicated in physical and digital objects themselves.  A DVD that can be 
played only on a DVD player encoded with complementary technology obtained 
from an “authorized” source exercises a form of governance over human behavior 
that we might historically have presumed could arise only via human agency.   
Yet precisely because things exercise authority, objects—especially configurable 
and re-configurable objects of the sort that digital and biotechnology advances now 
enable—can be tremendously inexpensive and effective way of communicating in 
those same contexts.168  Objects have semiotic or symbolic as well as instrumental 
virtues.  Social groups, for example, both create and depend on objects.  As Wendy 
Gordon has noted, “Shareable goods are a traditional source of binding groups 
together: not only standard ‘public goods’ such as highways and defense, but also 
folk tales, art, songs, and symphonies.”169  Objects need not be tangible; they can be 
virtual.  Beth Noveck observes that in social contexts on the Internet, online groups 
depend on stable digital representations of group members and group-related 
objects.170  Thomas Schelling described the concept of “focal points,” now 
sometimes referred to as “Schelling Points,” to describe objects or sites around 
which individuals coordinate their activities.171  Science, Technology, and Society 
(STS) scholars refer to “affordances” of objects in the physical world to denote the 
role that objects play in shaping how individuals behave and how group dynamics 
evolve.172  Customs, traditions, patterns, and practices of reproduction, modification, 
and use develop and intersect via connections to things.173  Communications 
channels develop to discuss, respond to, and simply to use things.  Things embody 
information that communities and groups develop, deposit, and extract.174
Things occupy these social and authoritative roles via their presence and relative 
permanence, but things are not simply given.  They are created, and they evolve.  We 
tend to understand intuitively that the world around us has a constructed character, 
and we can use ordinary tools of regulation, much of the time, to affect its shape.  
For safety reasons, the federal government requires that the automobile include seat 
belts and air bags, for example, and a third brake light (the “Liddy light”).  Digital 
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169Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 
644 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). 
170See Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy of Groups, 10 FIRST MONDAY (Nov. 2005), 
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technology now shows us the limits of this approach.  As Radin has argued, what we 
ordinarily think of as legal questions can get submerged in the design of digital 
objects and computer programs, which deprives legal institutions of their usual 
regulatory levers and leaves us seemingly at a loss for what to do.175
Yet law is not really so helpless.  It has quite an elaborate set of mechanisms that 
it uses to create and manage “thing-ness,” that is, both to regulate the extent to which 
“legal” and “technical” issues merge, and more broadly to police boundaries between 
commodities and objects, that is, to recognize the good in things.  Much as we 
suggested in the last Section that narratives of objects be made more explicit, we 
argue that an equivalent concern for salience can be brought to bear on things 
themselves.  Sometimes the law reinforces thing-ness, for example, by increasing the 
hard edges of copyrights and patents, or software licenses, such as the open source 
“General Public License” that coordinates group activity.  Sometimes the law 
disables or moderates thing-ness, by loosening those edges with exceptions and 
limitations.  The STS tradition, which is especially attentive to changes in things 
over time, commends situating thing-ness by referring to practices.  A thing might be 
defined by how it is used, an approach that we see in commercial law, for example.  
The law also manages thing-ness by referring to economics (“the welfare effects of 
things”), to bargains and contracting (via clickwrap agreements, the parties agree on 
what a “thing” “is,” and courts get to choose whether or not to validate that 
agreement), to design (“it’s just the way things are,” or more precisely, the way the 
designer chooses to make the thing), and/or to the essential properties of the object 
(“the natural or essential character of things”).  Each of these approaches has 
strengths and weaknesses, and no single approach is right for all occasions.  But the 
law generally has a robust set of tools to manage this question. 
As but one example, consider books.  Copyright commentators have noted that 
the Internet lacks the material characteristics that defined traditional copyright law.  
In particular, the lack of "book-ish"-ness of information created, stored and 
distributed on electronic networks has been a cause for concern on the ground that it 
appears to signify the passing of an effective doctrine of first sale,176 among other 
things.  Publishers “license” the distribution of digital books.  Since consumers do 
not acquire ownership of their “copies,” courts may decide that the doctrine of first 
sale does not apply; in other words, while the purchaser of a traditional book may 
resell that copy, the “purchaser,” or rather, “licensee,” of an electronic book may not 
do so.  Part of the problem is that the question "What is a book?" has to be re-asked 
when text is presented in electronic form.  Should it matter how books are produced?  
Should it matter how books are consumed?  So far, it appears, what matters most is 
an “objective” definition of the book, and an electronic book is not "a book,"177
though the question is hardly free from doubt.   
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Similar questions have arisen even more recently in the context of Google’s 
ambitious proposal to create a searchable digital archive that contains the entirety of 
the collections of some this country’s largest academic libraries.  This is Google 
Book Search.  To the extent that publishers of copyrighted works in these collections 
object to the digitization without their authorization, the project faces some 
important challenges under copyright law.  Google appears to be making millions of 
unauthorized “copies” of copyrighted works without the permission of the copyright 
owners.  Or, perhaps Google is engaged in the application of the fair use doctrine at a 
scale never before imagined in human history.  Google is, in a sense, a 21st century 
digital extension of the university and of the library, making knowledge accessible 
and interpretable on a scale never before attempted, but uniquely suited to the new 
networked international cultural community. 
Which is it?  Here, even more starkly than with “new use” and “new technology” 
problems posed by electronic books, we benefit not only from thinking about what 
kind of narrative helps put the various pieces and places into some kind of coherent 
scheme, but also from thinking about what it means for a library to house “a book”—
as opposed to (or in addition to) a warehouse of the information that those books 
contain.  Importantly, and to connect this theme to the first two, “books” are both 
objects, and metaphors. 
D. On Place and Space178
A different, or perhaps supplemental, way to look at the Google Book Search 
example is to recover the physicalist metaphor that Radin, among others, largely 
rejects.  To its defenders, Google Book Search appeals partly to our collective sense 
that libraries exist to organize and distribute information for public benefit, so that 
Google—which might be characterized as organizing and distributing that 
information on a massive scale—is simply stepping into the librarians’ shoes.  Yet 
libraries are places and spaces as much as they are domains of intellectual activity.  
Sociologists and geographers are acutely aware of the role of place and its cousin, 
space, in ordering human behavior.179  Individuals want and need to know where they 
are, and where others are, in order to manage various communicative practices.180
This relationship flows in the opposite direction as well.  Critical geographers point 
out that places derive their character from the social practices situated there.181  Place 
and space structure social relationships, and are structured by them. 
                                                                
178The material in this Section is drawn in part from Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access 
and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2003) [hereinafter Madison, Rights of 
Access]. 
179There is a vast literature on how various attributes of place and space, including 
distance, “adjacence,” and permanence, support and instantiate social relations.  See, e.g.,
WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE AND THE INFOBAHN (1995); Jerry Frug, 
The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996); Thomas Gieryn, A Space for 
Place in Sociology, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 463, 463-96 (2000). 
180See, e.g., EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966) (describing the social use 
of space as the practice of “proxemics,” borrowing from “proximity” as the most important 
social feature of space).   
181See MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Steven Rendall trans., 
Univ. of Cal. Press 1988) (1984); DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL
GEOGRAPHY (2001); Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological 
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In the physical world, Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford, and others pointed out long 
ago the extent to which we take space and place for granted, and the extent to 
which—resisting that sense—we can manage our environment to produce and 
support different kinds of social interaction.182  Architects and planners can do this 
through design.  Law, too, can do it by rewarding features of the physical 
environment that signal the presence of bounded places.183  The urban planner Kevin 
Lynch demonstrated this in The Image of the City,184 concluding that inhabitants of a 
city relied on mental “readings” of their cities, focusing on landmarks and 
boundaries: “[I]f the environment is visibly organized and sharply identified, then 
the citizen can inform it with his own meanings and connections.  Then it will 
become a true place, remarkable and unmistakable.”185  Lynch used his subjects’ 
reactions to the delineation of their environments as measures of “imageability,” 
defined as “that quality in a physical object which gives it a high probability of 
evoking a strong image in any given observer.  It is that shape, color, or arrangement 
which facilitates the making of vividly identified, powerfully structured, highly 
useful mental images of the environment.”186  An “imageable” city conveys a 
coherent mental map to its inhabitants.187  Place is not simply a matter of where you 
are.  Place and space are cognitive constructs.
When the question is how to develop a sense of what Radin might call a 
metaphorical legal neighborhood, or what we might call legal urbanity, the same 
lessons apply.  The environmental heterogeneity and salience that Jacobs and 
Mumford praised, and the “imageability” that Lynch described, can be developed in 
legal contexts.  How do we trade commodity against object, or recognize free speech 
or unfair competition law as domains that are adjacent to property law?  Radin, like 
other scholars, is skeptical of the use of place and space metaphors in legal analysis.  
But we argue that those resources can be turned to our advantage.  The apparent 
“physical” features of an online setting may be sufficiently stable to signify “place” 
to the individuals who “go” and “stay” there.  With objects, the law might affirm the 
salience of the “good” objects and lessen the salience (and heighten the relational 
character) of the bad.  
Law has the tools for this exercise, which we can use to reward “imageability.”  
Online, for example, boundaries, borders, and connections in computer networks 
may be omnipresent as a technical matter but hidden, for all intents and purposes, 
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from the perspective of those who use those networks.  Law and policy may 
intervene to promote (or lessen) the salience of those boundaries and borders in a 
variety of doctrinal settings.  Purported acceptances of offers of clickwrap 
agreements and “terms of use” may be deemed ineffective if offers are not 
sufficiently visible.188  “Technological protection measures” that trigger application 
of the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act may 
be deemed “ineffective” if the user is not sufficiently warned of their existence.189  In 
property law, it might be argued that the doctrine of “trespass to chattels” may not be 
invoked by the owner of an online data resource unless the boundary that the 
defendant has crossed is marked in some clear, human-readable way.190
E. On Convention, Pattern, and Practice191
Among the socially-constructed recourses at our metaphorical disposal here are 
social phenomena themselves.  We experience the world not only in terms of the 
language that we use, the stories that we tell, the objects that we make and find, and 
the places that we inhabit, but in terms of the social organization that we build.  A 
fifth tool that we might explore in elaborating and supplementing Radin’s relational 
analysis is the study of groups, and more precisely, the study of social practices and 
disciplines. 
This is a difficult concept to capture briefly, since so much has been written by so 
many and from a broad variety of perspectives.  In a recent article on fair use in 
copyright law, one of us analyzed economic, sociological, cultural and 
anthropological literature and concluded that the law can effectively query patterns 
of social behavior oriented around particular disciplines or practices, such as 
journalism, or scholarship.  In turn, those patterns may serve as stable referents for 
applying the notoriously elusive “fair use” concept.  But while we are guided by the 
belief that that each of these bodies of literature is ultimately talking about the same 
subject, that sense is more tentative than firm. 
Disciplines, for example, come with sets of rules.  Those are soft rules, to be 
sure, but typically rules that are recognized both inside and outside the discipline and 
that police the borders of the discipline and activity by its members.  Professional 
disciplines are not the only sources of rules.  Rules can be borrowed from outside 
contexts, or they can emerge from sustained interaction among individuals.  They 
may be formal; they may consist of social norms; and/or they may consist of 
conventions or regularities in social behavior.  Among other things, this echoes the 
notion of "fields" of practice proposed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, 
who offered the idea of the habitus to define the formal and informal processes—the 
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knowledge base, the internalized codes of thought and action, and manners of 
thought, or in sum, the feel for how things are done, or the activities and concepts 
that both unify and produce practices and representations—that constrain action 
within a given domain.192
Equally helpful analytic resources here include the broad concepts of the 
institution, which encompasses individuals, groups, relationships, and cognitive 
schemes and frames for constructing them;193 the community of practice, groups of 
individuals united informally by shared normative expectations, habits, customs, and 
group identity;194 and "practice" itself, defined as a shared but informal set of 
practical understandings, with a normative component, embedded in social 
structures.195  The underlying point is that the existence and content of a given 
pattern cannot be determined entirely or even primarily within the analytic 
framework supplied by legal doctrine itself.  The tool here is part of a broader 
theoretical approach that situates the foundations of stable law largely in social 
conventions rather than solely in legal institutions.196
The common issue is the extent of limitations on discretionary behavior within a 
specified social or cultural network, limitations that might be internalized via 
socialization or professional training, or that might be imposed externally via 
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participation in the pattern, or both.  Social "norms" as guides to individual behavior 
are relevant, but they are neither the necessary beginning nor the end of the question.  
A social or cultural pattern may be defined by informal expectations, customs, and 
habits, by norms, by more formal organizations, institutions, or hierarchies, by 
communications and coordination networks, or by a combination of these.197
Relevant evidence may consist of individual practices and behaviors themselves, 
structures of formal and informal groups, and descriptions of cognitive structures, 
such as schemata and scripts.198  Evidence may be purely contemporary, or it may 
incorporate history and tradition.   
We should make explicit that a “disciplinary” tool accepts at least the possibility 
of group agency alongside traditional accounts of individual agency.  At the very 
least, the two perspectives need to be accounted for.  Anthony Giddens does so with 
his "structuration" thesis, positing that individuals (particular actions) and groups 
(rules) are functionally inseparable because they are in the ongoing process of 
simultaneously constructing each other.199  Intentionality is contextual, making social 
groups and structures an inherent part of social analysis.  Mark Johnson explains this 
point in terms that crystallizes the social practices perspective and connects it to the 
frameworks above that are based more explicitly on metaphor and cognition:  
[A]ny statements we make, any directives we give, any rules we lay down 
are applicable, not because the concepts specify their own determinate 
conditions of satisfaction, but rather because we understand these 
concepts and rules relative to shared idealized cognitive models, scripts, 
and narratives that are tied to embodied experiences, communal histories, 
practices, and values. The rules can work, when they work, precisely 
because of these framing cognitive models and practices.  They are not . . . 
merely non-propositional, non-semantic background assumptions.  Rather, 
they are part of our conceptual apparatus by which we make sense of and 
act purposively within concrete situations.200
How might we make use of this method in approaching the underlying question 
of commodities and objects?  How do social practices illuminate the relational 
character of that question?  One example is patent law.  Scholars looking at the 
sociology of science have recognized that the optimal organization of scientific 
research consists of independent communities of researchers working with 
knowledge of one another’s activities.201  Welfare costs from duplicative research are 
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more than offset by correction of mistakes, confirmation of research results, and 
differential analyses of common data, leading to better syntheses.202  Pure “science,” 
in turn, receives special dispensations in intellectual property law.  “Laws of nature” 
(the objects of basic scientific research) are unpatentable.  Until recently, academic 
practitioners of patented technology could look to an “experimental use” exemption 
from liability for patent infringement.  Measuring what is “basic” and therefore 
unpatentable is a disciplinary problem; like most patent law metrics, the issue is 
framed in terms of the understanding of a hypothetical “Person Having Ordinary 
Skill in the Art.”  What is in and what is out, in other words, is explicitly a question 
of disciplinary understanding.  The experimental use doctrine shows how 
disciplinary bulwarks that historically have protected the public domain from 
propertization may evolve as the discipline itself evolves.  The Federal Circuit 
appears to have cut back the experimental use exception dramatically, on the 
rationale that university-based research are no longer presumptively entitled to rely 
on characterization by reference to a disciplinary understanding of “basic science,”203
and therefore should not presume that university-based research is not subject to 
ordinary rules of patent infringement.   
Disciplinary practices and normative communities are, in part, sorts of narratives, 
and we connect them explicitly to metaphor and to the cognitive basis for using 
language-based tools.  Disciplines and practices are frequently if not necessarily 
grounded in space and time, and equally frequently they are organized around 
objects and other things.204  This perspective, like the four previously reviewed, is 
not perfectly independent of any other.  But social practices do have power in 
themselves, not merely by virtue of the stories we tell about them, or that their 
members tells about themselves, and they are sources of norms and sources of 
commitment that the law can borrow to articulate relational understandings of 
property interests more robust. 
IV. CONCLUSION
What we have tried to do in this Comment is give a sense of the variety of 
approaches and tools that both practitioners and theorists of the law might explore in 
tackling some of the difficult issues of property and related theory that Margaret 
Radin points to.  The relational approach to those problems can be more effectively 
analyzed if we embrace, rather than exclude, metaphorical, conceptual, and 
experiential methods.  We have suggested some of those methods here.  There are 
others, and there are blends and refinements to what we have presented.   
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We close with a final observation.  Perhaps a more effective metaphor for the 
whole analysis is not a neighborhood in the context of a city, as Radin suggests, but a 
network.  Rather than drawing a suitable balance in terms of the salience and the 
permeability of boundaries between disciplines and between doctrinal signposts 
within disciplines, perhaps we should think of law as a network to be interpreted.205
The notion of a network preserves a relational, metaphoric dynamism and also 
permits positive objectification.  The task is to know where and when and how to 
identify nodes in the network, and to articulate connections and dependencies 
between and among them.  The task is also to understand that these nodes and 
connections are constructs that can and perhaps should change.  The hermeneutic 
task here might be compared to that of an architect or designer trying to bring sense 
to the signs that the human world presents.206  What Radin brings and has brought to 
property law and to legal theory in general is an unfailing embrace of the multiplicity 
of disciplines that bear on particular problems.  What we want to do here is celebrate 
this facet of her work, and suggest how to advance her critique a bit beyond even 
where she has taken it so far.  We hope that the methods we suggest, taken in tandem 
with Radin’s observations about the dynamism of our culture and economy, offer 
some thought-provoking and potentially useful avenues for research and application. 
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